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The conventional result of the theory of the public enforcement of law is that
wrongful convictions of innocents are detrimental to deterrence. This proposition has been challenged recently. In some cases, wrongful convictions do not
jeopardize deterrence, because they influence equally the innocent and the guilty.
Therefore deterrence does not change. We show that, in general, wrongful convictions do lower deterrence. We prove that wrongful convictions do not jeopardize deterrence only in very limited circumstances or under unlikely assumptions.

(JEL: K4)

1 Introduction

In most of the economic literature, judicial errors are usually understood as wrongful

convictions of actually innocent defendants and wrongful acquittals of actually
guilty defendants.1 In the literature on optimal deterrence that followed the seminal

work by Becker (1968), wrongful convictions came first into focus with the work
of Harris (1970), who extended the model to include the social costs of wrongful
convictions. Recent surveys of the standard theory of optimal deterrence show how
wrongful convictions are as detrimental to deterrence as wrongful acquittals (for
example, Polinsky and Shavell, 2007).
The conventional result that wrongful convictions hurt deterrence is based upon
the work of Png (1986). On one hand, wrongful acquittals improve the expected payoffs of committing crime, but, on the other hand, wrongful convictions decrease the

* University of Illinois College of Law (corresponding author) and Free University
of Bozen-Bolzano, School of Economics and Management. We thank Henrik Lando
for the stimulating discussion even if we only agree to disagree. We also thank one
anonymous referee, Tom Miceli, and Mitch Polinsky for important comments. We are
grateful to Roya H. Samarghandi for editorial assistance. The usual disclaimers apply.
These are the so-called outcome errors. Legal scholars also distinguish factual errors , for which the relevant facts are erroneously identified, and legal errors , for which

the proper legal standard is mistakenly assessed; see Khanna (2002). We refer only to
the first type of errors.
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expected payoffs of staying honest. On balance, an increment in either prob

decreases deterrence. Therefore, Png makes two relevant points: (i) wrong

victions (and not only wrongful acquittals) diminish deterrence; and (ii) w

convictions and wrongful acquittals are equally bad in their effect on deterr

the margin, one further wrongful conviction induces as many individuals to

behavior from compliance to noncompliance as one further wrongful acquitt

In a provocative paper, Lando (2006) questions the conventional result

theory of the public enforcement of law that wrongful convictions of inno

detrimental to deterrence. He distinguishes between mistakes of act and m

of identity, and claims that, for the latter, wrongful convictions do not jeo
deterrence. Mistakes of act happen when somebody is convicted for a crime

not actually happen. As an example, Lando points to the case of speeding
where the police fail to report the actual speed correctly because of meas
errors. But it could be also the case for insider trading in corporate crim
or tacit collusion in antitrust law.3 These are typically cases for which the p
question faced by the court is whether or not there was any actual crim
potential crimes are difficult to prove because there is no evident "smokin
Mistakes of identity happen when one individual is punished for a crime com
by somebody else. In the context of evident crimes, such as murders and ro
the wrong person can be incriminated for an act that actually did happen.
The novel argument proposed by Lando is the following. When mista
identity happen, and also when criminals can be punished for the crimes of

then the expected returns to not committing the crime decrease equally for the

and for the criminal. Thus, individuals do not switch behavior; in other

deterrence is not jeopardized. In the present paper, we show that Lando's c

only be true in very limited circumstances or under unlikely assumption

generally, it is realistic to suppose that wrongful convictions do lower deter
suggested by the conventional literature.

A numerical example is illustrative. Suppose the probability of convic

a criminal is 0.5 and the fine is fifty dollars. The expected fine is twenty-fiv

Everyone who derives a benefit higher than twenty-five dollars from com
a crime is not deterred.

The idea developed by Png is the following. Suppose the probability of conviction

of an innocent is 0.1. The expected fine paid by an innocent is five dollars. As
a consequence, anyone who derives a benefit higher than twenty dollars (twentyfive dollars minus five dollars) from committing a crime is not deterred. Deterrence

has been diminished as a consequence of wrongful convictions.
2 In this stream of literature one should also mention the work of Ehrlich (1982),
who suggested the hypothesis that the conviction of the innocent may increase (instead
of decrease) deterrence if such conviction is perceived by other imperfectly informed
would-be offenders in society as a correct conviction of a guilty individual.
3 A wise stock investment may be misread as insider trading, a certain competitive-

market equilibrium may be misunderstood as tacit collusion, and a suicide may be

mistaken for a homicide.
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The point raised by Lando is that the example we have develope
only to mistakes of act. When we consider mistakes of identity,
also be wrongfully convicted. The expected fine of five dollars i
innocents and guilty equally. As a consequence, the threshold is s
dollars, and deterrence has not been jeopardized. His conclusion i

assumption that the probability of a mistake of identity spreads thi

population of both innocent and guilty individuals (whereas mis
concern innocents).

However, an important implication of the existence of mistakes

been overlooked. For every wrongful conviction (of either an innoce

dividual) there must be a wrongful acquittal of a factually guilty ind

words, for mistakes of identity, one must equalize the number of m

number of crimes committed in order to balance the demand and th

takes. We show that, in general, wrongful convictions do lower det

the probabilities of mistakes influence innocents and guilty equally

up because these probabilities of mistake of identity also affect wr

Looking at our numerical example, we propose that if the probabili

by mistakes of identity is 0.1 for both guilty and innocent, then t

a wrongful acquittal has to go up, for example, to 0.6 in order to h

tween mistakes of identity and crimes committed. As a consequence

of rightful conviction is now 0.4, and not 0.5. The critical threshol

dollars. Deterrence has been jeopardized as a consequence of mista

In this paper we contest the idea that wrongful convictions do not di

when we consider mistakes of identity. Notwithstanding, more
acknowledges that wrongful convictions may still diminish deter
reasons: (i) given the existence of a criminal opportunity, the re
staying honest is reduced if others commit a crime and therefore i
of a wrongful conviction; (ii) the conviction of an innocent often
real wrongdoer is free, and this could further dilute deterrence

being mistakenly punished for a higher-order crime induces the cr

another, lower-order crime (a standard marginal-deterrence argume

The paper goes as follows. Section 2 develops a formal model. Fi
addressed in section 3.
2 The Model

In this model, there is only one type of crime.5 Individuals have to decide whether

or not to commit this crime, and each individual can commit the crime only once

4 As to (iii), the result can be reversed if (as Lando argues) the choice is continuous
and not discrete (the wrongdoer can tune the degree of care). Furthermore, wrongfu
convictions might increase deterrence if correct sentencing for a given crime increases
the likelihood of a wrongful conviction in the future.
There are different possible interpretations. There are crimes for which both types
of errors can happen (such as the speeding example). Alternatively, consider two dif-
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Individuals are then tried in court and sanctioned subject to the two types of er

wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals. Let b be the gains to the indiv
from committing the crime, and s the sanction imposed by the court.

Let us define £1 as the probability of wrongful acquittal for a crime one
committed (hence a conditional probability given guilt); e2 as that of wrong
conviction for a crime that has not been committed (a conditional probability g
innocence); and £3 as that of wrongful conviction for someone else's crime.
last probability applies to innocents and guilty alike (hence £3 is an uncondi
probability). Figure 1 summarizes the different possibilities from the viewpoin
person A when there is another crime committed by person B.6
Notice that the game tree describes the most generic game and in princ
concerns both mistakes of act and mistakes of identity. We confront her
models, one where there are mistakes of act and the other where there are mis

of identity. Mistakes of act are convictions for crimes that never happened
thus for which there are no corresponding criminals acquitted. In this case
probabilities of wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals are independent,

thus an increase in wrongful convictions does not imply any change in the prop

of wrongful acquittals. Mistakes of identity, instead, are crimes for which the w

ferent crimes (one to fit mistakes of act and one to fit mistakes of identity) subjec
the same social cost and the same probability of being detected.
6 If £3 only applies when person A has not been convicted of crime A, in the
text of Figure 1, then Lando' s result never holds, because all three errors reduce d
rence.
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person is convicted for a given crime, and for the same crime, a
is wrongfully acquitted.7 In this case, wrongful convictions and w
for a given crime are linked, as the conviction of an innocent p
acquittal of the person actually responsible for it.

The expected sanction borne by a criminal is (1 - £' 4- £3)5, an
sanction borne by an innocent is (s2 + £3)^ An individual comm

long as b>b*, where

(1)
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victions also for other criminals undermines the conventional wisdom. If Lando's

assumption is correct, then wrongful convictions have no effect on deterrence, while

wrongful acquittals diminish deterrence. However, his insight neglects an important
balance between mistakes of identity and actual crimes.
In fact, notice that while mistakes of act are convictions for crimes that never hap-

pened and thus for which there are no corresponding criminals acquitted, mistakes
of identity, instead, are crimes for which the wrong person is convicted for a given
crime, and for the same crime, a guilty person is wrongfully acquitted.8

7 Lando argues that these are the cases where the occurrence of a crime is incontrovertible; only the identity of the criminal is questionable. There are of course crimes
that are borderline; think for instance of cases of looks-like homicides that in fact are
suicides, or of unintentional losses that are taken as thefts (for which thus a mistake of
act becomes a mistake of identity).
8 In the case of mistakes of act, the crime rate is overestimated, as there are more

crimes than actual criminals. This should not be a problem as long as the population
is sufficiently large.
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Figure 2
The Game Tree under Png's and Lando' s Restrictive Assumptions Respectively
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Therefore, if there is a mistake of identity, then t
conviction (either of an innocent or of a guilty person)

Given this equality, we can equate the following:

(2) €in^ = e3n + £3(l -n) .
supply of errors demand for errors

The expression (2) describes the supply-demand equilibrium in the market for errors
when mistakes of identity occur. Applying our notation, we also have that

(3) i-n = G[(l-el-s2)s].

Together, (2) and (3) determine n(s2 , £3,
now analyze how the equilibrium is pert

of £3. We differentiate both equations (2)

E'dn + nde ' = de 3,

dn = g{-)sds'.
By substitution, we get

(4) - = g(-)*
de 3 n

+ g(-)se 1

Clearly, from (4), dn /de 3 > 0 for all e2 and £3.

with the probability of mistakes of identity. Th

likelihood of wrongful convictions increases t
quence, the supply of errors has to increase for

necessarily the number of criminals has to incre

9 We can easily generalize the model for the po
conviction for x wrongful acquittals.
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From (2) and (3), we can also see that the result obtained by L
under a specific assumption. By applying total differentiation
obtain

dn _ g(')sde3 + ng{-)sde2
n + g(-)ss i
Therefore, in order to conclude that dn = 0 as Lando did, we would need to
have ds2/de3 = - '/n. When the likelihood of mistakes of identity increases, the
likelihood of mistakes of act must decrease in a particular way (namely, at rate
-1 /n). There is no reason to think that such assumption is satisfied in general, and
particularly in the examples offered by Lando.

3 Final Remarks

Generally speaking, wrongful convictions do lower deterrence unless some specific
relationship exists between mistakes of identity and mistakes of act. The conventional result of the theory of public law enforcement seems to be robust to the
possibility that wrongful convictions also affect criminals.

Refuting the generality of Lando's argument has important theoretical and policy implications. Rules of evidence, as well as other characteristics of criminal
procedure, all seek to produce as few wrongful convictions as possible even at
the cost of allowing many wrongful acquittals. If Lando's insight were of general
application, deterrence-based explanations would be flawed, since wrongful convictions should be simply irrelevant. The pro-defendant bias of criminal procedure

would have to be explained in other terms. Our model points out that Lando's
insight is of little practical applicability. Therefore, our model supports the basic
theoretical framework and supports the significant relevance of a growing body of
work explaining why wrongful convictions are more socially costly than wrongful
acquittals.10
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